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DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION IN LONG-TERM 
CARE: USING THE FAIR HOUSING ACT TO 
PREVENT ILLEGAL SCREENING IN ADMISSIONS TO 
NURSING HOMES AND ASSISTED 
LIVING FACILITIES 
ERIC M. CARLSON* 
INTRODUCTION 
Before making an admission decision, a nursing home 1 
often requires an applicant to disclose a significant portion of 
her medical records. The applicant likely presumes that the 
nursing home needs this information to determine if the nursing 
home can meet her health care needs. 
This presumption is often wrong. The information is 
reviewed not by nurses but by administrators, and not for care 
planning but instead for calculating the applicant's potential 
profitability to the facility. A telling advertisement for one nurs-
ing home software package brags to potential customers that 
" [ w] ith Admission Analysis you can finally manage your bottom 
line one admission at a time!"2 
As a result of this type of screening, facilities frequently deny 
admission to applicants who appear to be less profitable or are 
otherwise less than desirable. For example, a facility may avoid 
admitting applicants with severe Alzheimer's disease, AIDS, or 
antibiotic-resistant infections, even though nursing homes and 
* Eric Carlson is Director of the Long-Term Care Project at the National 
Senior Citizens Law Center. Mr. Carlson thanks the Borchard Foundation 
Center on Law and Aging for supporting the writing of this article. Elizabeth 
Mustard assisted with research. Helpful comments were provided by Michael 
Allen, Stephanie Edelstein, Edward King, Nina Kohn, David Lipschutz, Graciela 
Martinez, Gerald McIntyre, and Edward Spurgeon. Of course, any errors are 
attributable to the author alone. 
1. "Nursing facility" is the term used by federal law to refer to a facility 
known in the vernacular as a "nursing home." See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3 
(requirements for Medicare certification of "skilled nursing facility"), 1396r 
(requirements for Medicaid certification of "nursing facility") (2000). For ease 
of use, this Article uses the term "nursing home" rather than "nursing facility" 
or "skilled nursing facility." 
2. American HealthTech, Inc., With Admission Analysis You Can Finally 
Manage Your Bottom Line One Admission at a Time!, http:/ /www.healthtech. 
net/aamodule.pdf (last visited February 3, 2007). 
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many assisted living facilities are required to be capable of han-
dling such medical conditions. 
A rejected applicant may have a viable claim against the 
nursing home for discrimination on the basis of disability, 3 but 
such cases are rarely brought. Most applicants are unaware of 
the relevant law, and litigation is expensive and time-consuming. 
For most rejected applicants it makes more sense to move on and 
seek residence elsewhere. 
Potentially this screening could be curbed by active enforce-
ment of the Fair Housing Act's no-inquiry regulation, which pro-
hibits a housing provider from inquiring into a handicap4 of an 
applicant for tenancy. 5 Courts have ruled consistently that the 
Fair Housing Act (FHA) applies to nursing homes, assisted living 
facilities, 6 and other long-term care facilities, because each of 
these facilities is considered a "dwelling" under the FHA.7 
Regardless of these consistent rulings regarding the applica-
bility of the FHA, case law contains no hint that the FHA's no-
inquiry regulation ever has been asserted against a long-term 
facility. This inactivity presumably is due to the relatively low 
profile of long-term care issues amongst attorneys and the gen-
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2000) (under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act no disability-based discrimination is allowed in a "place of public accommo-
dation "); 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000) (under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act no disability-based discrimination is allowed in a federally-funded program 
or activity); see also Wagner v. Fair Acres Geriatric Ctr., 49 F.3d 1002 (3d Cir. 
1995) (holding that a nursing home illegally discriminated by refusing to admit 
an applicant with aggressive dementia); Grubbs v. Med. Facilities of Arn., Inc., 
879 F. Supp. 588 (W.D. Va. 1995) (dismissing a nursing home applicant's Reha-
bilitation Act suit alleging she was refused admission to a nursing home due to 
obesity). 
4. As the Americans with Disabilities Act indicates, "disability" now is pre-
ferred over "handicap" as the legal term of art. See, e.g., Damon Rose, Don't Call 
Me Handicapped!, BBC NEWS MAc., Oct: 4, 2004, available at http:/ /news.bbc.co. 
uk/l/hi/magazine/3708576.stm. In this Article, the term "handicap" is used 
because that is the term employed by the Fair Housing Act. 
5. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(c) (2006). 
6. As discussed subsequently, assisted living differs significantly from state 
to state. See infra Part II.A. Even the name "assisted living" is not universal 
across states. A decreasing minority of states use other terms-for example, 
"residential care facility for the elderly" in California, "housing with services 
establishment" in Minnesota, and "personal care home" in Pennsylvania." See 
CAL. HEALTH & SAFE'IY CooE § 1569.1 (West 2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 144D.01 (4) (West 2005); 62 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1001 (West 1996); see also Eric 
Carlson, Who's In, Who's Out, and Who's Providing the Care, CRITICAL IssuEs IN 
AssISTED LMNG, May 2005, at 72-73 (providing a chart of names used by 
states). This Article uses the term "assisted living facility" generically to refer to 
these facilities. 
7. See infra Part IV.B. 
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eral public, and to a general but superficial sense in the legal 
community that the no-inquiry regulation is out of place in a 
long-term care setting. In a standard landlord-tenant relation-
ship-rental of an apartment, for example-an applicant's 
health care problems and needs should clearly not be subject to 
a landlord's review. In a long-term care setting, however, the 
facility seems to have at least some legitimate interest in an appli-
cant's health conditions. Initially at least, a strict no-inquiry rule 
appears to be a poor fit from a public policy perspective. 
On the other hand, a long-term care facility should not be 
discriminating on the basis of an applicant's health care condi-
tions, beyond making a threshold determination that the facility 
can meet the applicant's needs. The FHA's intent is contravened 
by a facility that cherry-picks those applicants with the "easiest" 
health care needs. 
Such discrimination could be prevented or at least inhibited 
by consistent application of a no-inquiry rule. After initial litiga-
tion establishing the applicability of the no-inquiry regulation in 
long-term care, facilities as a matter of course would receive only 
a limited amount of medical information from applicants, and 
thus would have much less ability to discriminate on the basis of 
medical condition. Discrimination thereafter would be pre-
vented without the need for case-by-case litigation. 
This Article is the first in-depth analysis of this issue.8 First, 
the Article briefly describes nursing homes and assisted living 
facilities, focusing on the types of care that can and cannot be 
8. This Article's author began discussion of the issue in a short article co-
written with Michael Allen. See Eric Carlson & Michael Allen, Why Does the Busi-
ness Manager Need My Compl,ete Medical History? An Examination of Housing Discrim-
ination in Long-Term Care, 16 NAELA NEWS 2 (Mar. 2004). Mr. Allen 
subsequently addressed the same issue briefly within an article that he co-wrote 
with Robert Schwemm. See Robert G. Schwemm & Michael Allen, For the &st of 
Their Lives: Seniors and the Fair Housing Act, 90 lowA L. REv. 121, 186-93 (2004). 
Also, a student note discusses the issue obliquely. See Lauren Sturm, Note, Fair 
Housing Issues in Continuing Care Retirement Communities (CCRCs): Can Residents Be 
Transferred Without Their Consent?, 6 N.Y. CrIY L. REv. 119, 127 (2004) (sug-
gesting that application of the no-inquiry regulation might be unworkable in 
the context of continuing care retirement communities). The issue is not 
addressed in any published ruling of a court or administrative agency. A 2002 
consent order enforces the no-inquiry regulation against the Resurrection 
Retirement Community of Chicago, but the order applies only to areas of the 
community in which the landlord does not provide long-term care services. See 
Consent Order, United States v. Resurrection Ret. Cmty., Inc., No. 02-CV-7453 
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 2002), availab/,e at http:/ /www.usdoj.gov/crt/housing/docu-
ments/resurrectsettle.htm; see also Complaint, Resurrection Ret. Cmty., Inc., No. 
02-CV-7453 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 2002), availab/,e at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ 
housing/documents/resurrectcomp.htm. In any case, the consent order never 
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provided in each, and on the facilities' use of applicants' medical 
information. The Article then sets out the structure and purpose 
of the FHA and its no-inquiry regulation. 9 
The Article analyzes if and how the FHA's no-inquiry regula-
tion can be applied to long-term care facilities. Case law over-
whelmingly demonstrates that long-term care facilities are 
considered "dwellings" and thus are covered by the FHA. Fur-
thermore, the relevant exceptions to the no-inquiry regulation 
do not necessarily apply to long-term care facilities-a facility 
currently is not compelled to require a handicap as a condition 
of admission, or offer admissions priority to applicants with a 
handicap or particular type of handicap. 
The Article concludes that the no-inquiry regulation will 
generally prohibit a long-term care facility from requiring disclo-
sure of applicants' medical information. Enforcement of the reg-
ulation in this way would make a positive change in long-term 
care facilities' admission practices. Long-term care facilities 
would have a powerful incentive to create appropriate admission 
priorities favoring applicants with handicaps. Establishing such a 
priority would enable a facility to obtain medical information 
from an applicant, but the scope of this information would be 
limited: in general, the minimum information necessary to estab-
lish that the applicant needs the facility's services, and to ensure 
that the applicant's needs do not exceed the facility's 
capabilities. 
Legal authority is less than conclusive on whether the no-
inquiry regulation applies only to applicants, or to both appli-
cants and tenants. The Article concludes that the no-inquiry reg-
ulation itself applies only to applicants, although other FHA 
provisions prohibit inquiries of tenants when those inquiries are 
made for harassment or other improper purposes. 
To review the viability of the Article's legal conclusions, the 
Article describes two typical applicants for long-term care, and 
examines their hypothetical applications to two long-term care 
facilities that employ appropriate admission priorities. In gen-
discusses whether or how the no-inquiry regulation is reconciled with a long-
term care facility's legitimate need for residents' health care information. 
9. Disability-based discrimination also is addressed by the Americans with 
Disabilities Act and (for federally-funded entities) by Section 504 of the Reha-
bilitation Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000) (Section 504), 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 12181-12189 (2000) (ADA's Title III, pertaining to public accommoda-
tions). Although the ADA and Section 504 each potentially could be relevant 
in an admission dispute involving a long-term care facility, neither is analyzed in 
this Article. The focus of this Article is on the FHA because only the FHA has 
an explicit no-inquiry rule applicable to housing. 
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eral, based on this Article's legal analysis, nursing facilities would 
have limited access to an applicant's medical information; an 
assisted living facility would have somewhat greater access, as 
would long-term care facilities with formalized specializations. In 
some situations, enforcement of the no-inquiry regulation would 
prevent facilities from viewing certain prejudicial information 
relating to an applicant's behavior. 
After admission, the facilities would have extensive access to 
a now-resident's medical information in order to conduct assess-
ments and plan care. Access would be denied only in rare cir-
cumstances-if, for example, the information was irrelevant to 
care planning and requested only for purposes of harassment. 
Overall, long-term care would benefit from the active 
enforcement of the FHA's no-inquiry regulation. In long-term 
care admissions currently, facilities assume carte blanche to dis-
criminate on the basis of an applicant's medical condition. 
Enforcement of the no-inquiry regulation would rebalance the 
playing field by forcing facilities to declare appropriate admis-
sion priorities in favor of persons with handicaps. These priori-
ties, in turn, would authorize disclosure of medical information, 
but only to the extent needed to determine the facility's appro-
priateness for the applicant's care needs. 
I. LONG-TERM F AGILITIES 
A. Residents and Services 
A nursing home provides housing and health care to per-
sons with significant health care needs. In recent years, nursing 
home residents' average health care needs have increased.10 
Based on 2004 data, 45 percent of nursing home residents suffer 
from dementia.11 Over 54 percent of residents are unable to 
walk without extensive or constant support, and another 4.3 per-
cent are in a bed or recliner at least twenty-two hours per day. 12 
Over 53 and 43 percent of residents suffer from bladder or bowel 
incontinence, respectively, and over 29 percent have contrac-
tures that limit the range of motion in their joints. 13 
10. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR 
GENERAL, OEI-05-01-00030, NURSE AIDE TRAINING 5, 9, 10 (Nov. 2002), available 
at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-05-0l-00030.pdf. 
11. CHARLENE HARRINGTON ET AL., NURSING FACILITIES, STAFFING, 
REsmENTS, AND FACILITI' DEFICIENCIES, 1998-2004, at 42 (2005), available at 
http:/ /www.nccnhr.org/public/245_1267 _11874.cfm. 
12. Id. at 36. 
13. Id. at 38, 52, 54. 
368 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBUC POUCY [Vol. 21 
In its bare-bones form, the definition of an assisted living 
facility is similar to the nursing home definition. Like a nursing 
home, an assisted living facility offers housing and necessary ser-
vices to older persons who, in most instances, need assistance 
with at least some activities of daily living. 14 The primary differ-
ence is that a nursing home offers much more extensive health 
care services. 
The scope of assisted living services differs significantly from 
state to state, because assisted living standards are set almost 
exclusively by state law. 15 To this point, federal law is virtually 
silent on assisted living standards. 16 
The scope of available services also may vary greatly from 
facility to facility within the same state. Although state law may 
establish the services that an assisted living facility is authorized 
to provide, the law often does not require that such a facility pro-
vide all or even most of the authorized services.17 Also, some 
states license multiple levels of assisted living; in these states, 
residents with greater needs reside in facilities licensed at a 
higher level. 18 
Assisted living residents often have access to a significant 
level of health care, provided either by facility staff or by visiting 
nurses or health aides. As a result, living in an assisted living 
facility now is a viable alternative for many persons who in the 
past would have been forced to move into a nursing home.19 As 
noted above, the health care needs of nursing home residents 
have increased in recent years. In part, this increase is attributa-
ble to the growing inclination of persons with less extensive 
14. See Assisted Living Federation of America, What Is Assisted Living?, 
http:/ /www.alfa.org/public/articles/details.cfm?id=l26 (last visited February 3, 
2007) ("defin[ing] an Assisted Living residence as a special combination of 
housing, personalized supportive services, and health care designed to meet the 
needs-both scheduled and unscheduled-of those who need help with activi-
ties of daily living"). See also Assisted Living Assocs. v. Moorestown Twp., 996 F. 
Supp. 409, 415-16 (D.NJ. 1998). 
15. See generally RoBERT MoLLICA & HEATHER joHNSON-UMARCHE, U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, STATE RESIDENTIAL CARE AND 
Ass1sTED LMNG POLICY (2004); see also Carlson, supra note 6. 
16. Eruc CARLsoN, LoNc-TERM CARE AovoCACY § 5.04[2] (2006). 
17. See MOLLICA, supra note 15, at 1-20 to 1-22; see also Carlson, supra 
note 6, at 33-35. 
18. See Carlson, supra note 6, at 19-21; see, e.g., Aruz. ADMIN. CoDE § 9-10-
701, 702 (2005) (three licensure levels); MoNT. CoDE ANN. § 50-5-226 (2)-(4) 
(2006) (same); 10-149-113 ME. CoDE R. § 2.8 (Weil 2006) (two licensure levels); 
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 198.006 (16)-(17) (West 2004) (same); N.Y. Pus. HEALTH 
LAw § 4651(15) (McKinney 2002 & Supp. 2007) ("enhanced" certification if 
certain standards are met). 
19. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 6, at 28-32. 
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health care needs to move into assisted living facilities rather 
than nursing homes. 
B. Disqualifying Medical Conditions 
Although their residents' care needs are steadily increasing, 
both nursing homes and assisted living facilities have limits to the 
care that they can provide. Accordingly, certain medical condi-
tions can disqualify a person for admission to either type of long-
term care facility. Such disqualifications are infrequent in nurs-
ing homes but a common reality in assisted living. 
Disqualification occurs infrequently in nursing homes 
because they are required to care for virtually any long-term care 
need. A nursing home has the broad obligation under the fed-
eral Nursing Home Reform Law to "provide services to attain or 
maintain the highest practicable physical, mental, and 
psychosocial well-being of each resident."20 The Reform Law's 
regulations require that a nursing home resident have access to a 
wide variety of "special services," including injections, tracheal 
suctioning, and care for a colostomy or tracheostomy.21 
Nonetheless, some long-term care needs may be beyond a 
nursing home's expertise. For example, the Reform Law's regu-
lations do not require explicitly that a nursing home provide ven-
tilator care, and only a small but increasing minority of facilities 
do so.22 
An inability to provide certain types of care is much more 
likely in assisted living. Assisted living facilities generally are not 
required to provide nursing care on-site, and most facilities 
choose not to do so. Under state assisted living law, facilities 
have a great deal of discretion in deciding the extent of the 
health care provided, and in evicting residents when a resident 
needs care that the facility does not wish to provide. 23 This dis-
cretion, however, is subject to challenge to the extent that the 
facility is discriminating based on disability or handicap. 24 
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(b) (2), 1396r(b)(2) (2000). 
21. 42 C.F.R. § 483.25(k) (2005). 
22. Bryant v. Ind. State Dep't of Health, 695 N.E.2d 975, 979 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1998) (nursing home not required to provide ventilator care); Letter from 
Laura A. Dummit, Director, Health Care-Medicare Payment Issues, United 
States General Accounting Office to The Honorable John B. Breaux, Chairman, 
Special Committee on Aging, United States Senate, et al., at 3 (June 13, 2002), 
http:/ /www.gao.gov/new.items/d0243lr.pdf (ventilator care traditionally pro-
vided by hospitals, but now being provided by nursing homes). 
23. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 6, at 24-35, 43-46. 
24. See, e.g., Potomac Group Home Corp. v. Montgomery County, 823 F. 
Supp. 1285, 1300-01 (D. Md. 1993) (invalidating under FHA a county require-
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Some limits are based on state law rather than facility discre-
tion. State licensure laws frequently prohibit an assisted living 
facility from admitting persons with certain medical conditions. 
In Wisconsin, for example, a community-based residential facility 
(a term used by Wisconsin for assisted living) is prohibited gener-
ally from admitting an applicant who is unable to get out of bed, 
is restrained physically, has psychiatric needs that are incompati-
ble with other residents, or requires either around-the-clock 
nurse supervision or more than three hours of nursing care 
weekly. 25 A Virginia assisted living facility generally cannot admit 
any applicant who is ventilator-dependent, has significant pres-
sure ulcers, needs around-the-clock nursing care, is dependent in 
at least four activities of daily living ( e.g., bathing, dressing, trans-
ferring, toileting, and eating),26 or is fed with a tube through the 
nose to the stomach.27 Some state-law limits-most notably here, 
the disqualifications under Wisconsin law for confinement to a 
bed, or need for more than three hours of nursing care weekly-
might be subject to challenge under federal anti-discrimination 
law. 
In recent years, state assisted living laws have become more 
accepting of certain health conditions.28 The advance guard of 
this movement is represented by those states that allow any condi-
tion or treatment to be accommodated at an assisted living facil-
ity, as long as the facility and a resident agree that satisfactory 
arrangements have been made. 29 These state laws generally 
ment that group home residents be capable of evacuating independently in an 
emergency); Baggett v. Baird, No. CIV.A.4:94CV0282-HLM, 1997 WL 151544, at 
*14-*16, (N.D. Ga. Feb. 18, 1997) (invalidating under FHA a state requirement 
that assisted living residents be ambulatory); Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, 
Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., 19 F. Supp. 2d 567, 571-75 (N.D. 
W.Va. 1998) (refusing to dismiss causes of action under ADA and FHA chal-
lenging state requirement that assisted living residents be ambulatory). 
25. Wis. AoMIN. CODE HFS § 83.06(1) (a) (2004) (partial list of disqualify-
ing conditions). 
26. See, e.g., JosHUA M. WIENER & RAYMOND J. HANLEY, U.S. DEPARTMENT 
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, MEASURING THE ACTNITIES OF DAILY LNING 
AMoNG THE ELDERLY: A GumE To NATIONAL SURVEYS 9-16 (1989), http://aspe. 
hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/guide.htm (listing and measuring deficits in ability to 
perform activities of daily living). 
27. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1805(C) (2002) (partial list of disqualifying 
conditions). 
28. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 6, at 24-35. 
29. See ALAsKA STAT. § 47.33.020([) (2004); 01~6-001 ARK. CODE R. 
§ 601.4 (Weil 2005) (Level I facilities); 01~6-002 ARK. CoDE R. § 601.4 (Weil 
2005) (Level II facilities); 410 IND. AoMIN. CoDE § 16.2-5-0.5(e) (2002); LA. 
AoMIN. CoDE tit. 48, §§ 8823, 8825 (1999); see also 048-20-012 WY. CoDE R. § 8 
(Weil 2001) (outside provider performing services that cannot legally be per-
formed by assisted living staff). 
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apply to the retention of residents, but not initial admis-
sions. 30 
C. Use of Applicants' Medical Information 
Often a long-term care facility has a legitimate need for lim-
ited access to an applicant's medical records. The need for infor-
mation is tied to the issues discussed in this Article's preceding 
subsections. Long-term care facilities have differing capabilities, 
so a facility should verify that the applicant needs the facility's 
services and that his needs do not exceed the facility's level-of-
care ceiling. Also, the applicant's care needs must not exceed 
any limit set by federal or state law. These determinations are 
particularly relevant for assisted living facilities, since their capac-
ity to provide care is less than that of nursing homes. 31 
Applicants' medical information should not be used to deny 
admission to those applicants whose care needs, although within 
a facility's capabilities, may require relatively more staff attention, 
or be perceived as distasteful by staff members or other residents. 
Statutory authority here is strong, although litigated cases are few 
and far between. The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act each prohibit discrimina-
tion based on medical condition. 32 The most prominent pub-
lished case, Wagner v. Fair Acres Geriatric Center, concerns a 
nursing home that had refused admission to a woman due to her 
Alzheimer's disease.33 The federal district court ruled in favor of 
the nursing home but the Third Circuit reversed, speaking in 
30. ALAsKA STAT.§ 47.33.020(£) (2004); 016-06-001 ARK. CODER.§ 601.4 
(Weil 2005) (Level I facilities); 016-06-002 ARK. CoDE R. § 601.4 (Weil 2005) 
(Level II facilities); IND. AoMIN. CoDE § 16.2-5-0.5(e) (2002); LA. AoMIN. CODE 
tit. 48, §§ 8823, 8825 (1999). 
31. See, e.g., ROSALIE KANE & KEREN BROWN WILSON, MRP Pusuc Poucv 
INSTITUTE, AssISTED LIVING IN THE UNITED STATES: A NEW PARADIGM FOR RESI-
DENTIAL CARE FOR FRAIL OLDER PERSONS? 37 (1993) ("Typically a team was 
involved in making initial determinations about suitability for entrance and/or 
care plans upon admission."); THE AssISTED LIVING QUALITY COALITION, 
AsSISTED LIVING QUALI'IY INITIATNE: BUILDING A STRUGrURE THAT PROMOTES 
QuALI'IY 68 (1998) (assisted living guidelines calling on facility to conduct "ini-
tial screening of the applicant to determine the setting's ability to meet the 
resident's anticipated health and service needs and preferences"). 
32. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000); 
Rehabilitation Act, Section 504, 42 U.S.C. § 794 (2000). See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12182(a) (2000) (under ADA, no disability-based discrimination in "place of 
public accommodation"); 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000) (under Section 504, no 
disability-based discrimination in federally-funded program or activity); 42 
U.S.C. § 12181 (7) (F) (2000) ("place of public accommodation" in ADA 
includes "hospital, or other service establishment"). 
33. Wagner, 49 F.3d at 1002. 
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strong terms against disability-based discrimination in long-term 
care admissions: 
Here there was ample evidence that [the woman's] aggres-
sive behaviors . . . rendered her . . . "a challenging and 
demanding patient." We find that this fact alone cannot 
justify her exclusion from a nursing home .... Otherwise 
nursing homes would be free to "pick and choose" among 
patients, accepting and admitting only the easiest patients 
to care for, leaving the more challenging and demanding 
patients with no place to tum for care. 34 
After admission, long-term care facilities routinely-and 
appropriately-use the medical information of the now-residents 
to assess the resident and prepare care plans. This is one topic 
on which providers,- regulators, and consumer advocates are in 
agreement-good long-term care requires that a resident's needs 
be assessed early and often, and that assessments are used to 
develop individualized plans. 35 
II. FAIR HOUSING ACT (FHA) 
A. FHA Overview 
The original Fair Housing Act (FHA) was enacted as part of 
the Civil Rights Act of 19681 prohibiting discrimination in hous-
ing on the basis of race, color, religion, and national origin.36 In 
197 4, "sex" was added as a prohibited factor of discrimination;37 
m 1988, the Fair Housing Amendments Act added "familial sta-
34. Id. at 1015. 
35. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(b) (2)-(3), 1396r(b) (2)-(3) (2000 & 
Supp. III 2003) (addressing assessments and care plans in nursing homes); 42 
C.F.R. § 483.20(b), (k) (2006) (same); NJ. ADMIN. CODE § 8:36-7.1 (2006) 
(assessments and service plans); UTAH AoMIN. CoDE r. 432-270-12, 432-270-13 
(2006) (same); SARAH GREENE BURGER ET AL., NURSING HOMES: GETTING GooD 
CARE THERE 38-57 (2d ed. 2002); THE Ass1sTED LIVING QuALITI COALITION, 
supra note 31, at 68 (assisted living guidelines providing that "[a]fter execution 
of a contract and within a reasonable time after move-in, the setting conducts a 
more complete assessment of the resident by an appropriately qualified per-
son," for development of service plan); Ass1sTED LIVING WoRKGROUP, AssuRING 
QUALI'JY IN AssISTED LIVING: GUIDELINES FOR FEDERAL AND STATE POLICY, STATE 
REGULATION, AND OPERATIONS 123-27 (2003) (expressing unanimous support 
for recommendations relating to assessments, and majority support for recom-
mendations relating to service plans);Jo1NT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF 
HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS, 2003-2005 ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR AssISTED 
LIVING 103-04, 112-18 (2002) (explaining assessments and service plans). 
36. Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (codified at 
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2000)). 
37. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
383, § 808(b)(l), 88 Stat. 633,729 (1974) (codified at42 U.S.C. §5301 (2000)). 
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tus" and "handicap."38 Regarding handicaps, a House Report 
from the 1988 legislation notes: 
Prohibiting discrimination against individuals with handi-
caps is a major step in changing the stereotypes that have 
served to exclude them from American life. These persons 
have been denied housing because of misperceptions, 
ignorance, and outright prejudice.39 
Consistent with these sentiments, the FHA defines "handi-
cap" broadly as "a physical or mental impairment which substan-
tially limits one or more of such person's major life activities," 
including instances in which a person has "a record of having 
such an impairment" or is "regarded as having such an impair-
ment."40 The regulations set out a lengthy but non-exclusive list 
of examples of a physical or mental impairment.41 The term 
"major life activities" also is described broadly, as "functions such 
as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, 
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and working."42 Notably, 
the definition of "handicap" under the FHA is substantially 
equivalent to the definition of "disability" used by the Section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act43 and by the ADA.44 
The FHA is enforceable either through private litigation or 
by the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD).45 Actions brought by HUD may be adjudicated in front 
of an administrative law judge or a federal court.46 
B. FHA 's No-Inquiry Regulation 
1. Regulatory Language and Administrative Commentary 
To a significant extent, the FHA's regulations merely restate 
the broad statutory prohibitions against handicap-based discrimi-
38. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 
§ 6(a)-(b)(2), (e), 102 Stat. 1619, 1622 (1988) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
39. H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 18 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2173, 2179. 
40. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h) (2000). 
41. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.201 (a) (2006). 
42. 24 C.F.R. § 100.20l(b). 
43. 29 U.S.C. § 705(9) (B) (2000) ("a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits one or more major life activities"). 
44. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (A) (2000) ("a physical or mental impairment 
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such 
individual"). 
45. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610 (addressing enforcement through HUD), 3613 
(addressing private litigation) (2000). 
46. 42 u.s.c. § 3612. 
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nation. In the FHA itself, the two principal subsections prohibit 
discrimination in the sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the terms 
of sale or rental.47 The corresponding regulatory language is vir-
tually word-for-word identical.48 
In an exception to this mirror-image pattern, the FHA's no-
inquiry regulation prohibits an owner or landlord from inquiring 
into whether an applicant has a handicap, or into a handicap's 
nature or severity.49 Certain exceptions will be discussed subse-
quently in this Article.so 
In the release of the FHA's disability-related regulations, 
HUD based the no-inquiry regulation on legislative intent-spe-
cifically, the House Report accompanying the Fair Housing 
Amendments Act.s 1 The House Report raises the no-inquiry 
issue in the context of the FHA's statement that none of its provi-
sions require making a dwelling available to a person who would 
be a "direct threat" or cause "substantial physical damage" to 
others' property.s2 The Report concludes that a landlord legally 
could inquire "whether the individual has engaged in acts that 
would pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other 
tenants,"s3 but would be prohibited by the FHA from making 
general inquiries relating to handicaps: 
This provision [regarding "direct threat" and "physical 
damage"] is not intended to give landlords and owners the 
right to ask prospective tenants and buyers blanket ques-
tions about the individuals' disabilities. Under Section 504 
of the Rehabilitation Act,s4 employers may not inquire, as 
part of pre-employment inquiries, whether an applicant is 
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(£) (1)-(2). 
48. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 3604(£) (1)-(2) with 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(a)-(b) 
(2006). 
49. 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(c). 
50. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(c) (1)-(5); see also infra at Part V. 
51. Implementation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 53 
Fed. Reg. 44992, 45001 (Nov. 7, 1988) (discussion accompanying release of reg-
ulations). The fact that the no-inquiry regulation is drawn in part from legisla-
tive intent, and not exclusively from statutory language, might raise questions as 
to its enforceability in private litigation. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 
(2001) (finding no private right of action to enforce disparate-impact regula-
tions implementing Title VI of Civil Rights Act). 
52. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(£)(9) (2000); see also 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(d) (2006) 
(corresponding provision in regulation). 
53. H.R. REr. No. 100-711, at 30 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2173, 2191. 
54. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) 
(2000), prohibits disability-based discrimination by an entity receiving federal 
funding; see also Implementation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 
54 Fed. Reg. 3232, 3246 (Jan. 23, 1989) (no-inquiry regulation as an "adapta-
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a handicapped person or as to the nature or severity of the 
handicap. Employers may only make pre-employment 
inquiries into an applicant's ability to perform job-related 
functions. Similarly, under this provision, only an inquiry 
into a prospective tenant's ability to meet tenancy require-
ments would be justified.55 
375 
As promulgated by HUD, the no-inquiry regulation is appli-
cable whether or not an applicant is perceived as potentially 
threatening to health, safety, or personal property. Housing 
providers had requested regulatory authorization to inquire into 
an applicant's "history of antisocial behavior or tendencies," but 
HUD declined to include the requested exception, reasoning 
that such an exception "might well be seen as creating or permit-
ting a presumption that individuals with handicaps generally 
pose a greater threat to the health or safety of others than do 
individuals without handicaps."56 Presumably this was meant to 
be consistent with the House Report's narrow concession that a 
landlord or owner could engage in "a targeted inquiry as to 
whether the individual has engaged in acts that would pose a 
direct threat to the health or safety of other tenants."57 
In recognition that an owner or landlord under certain cir-
cumstances might have a legitimate need to inquire into an 
applicant's handicap, the no-inquiry regulation includes limited 
exceptions. Two of these exceptions concern the use of illegal 
drugs.58 Another exception permits inquiry if the handicap 
relates to "an applicant's ability to meet the requirements of own-
ership or tenancy. "59 Two of the exceptions are particularly rele-
vant to long-term care facilities and will be examined in depth 
subsequently.60 These exceptions together permit inquiry if a 
dwelling or priority for a dwelling is available only to persons 
with handicaps or persons with a particular type of handicap.61 
To this point, the "priority" exceptions have come into play most 
tion of the 'pre-employment inquiries' provision in the section 504 
regulations"). 
55. H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 30. 
56. Implementation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 54 
Fed. Reg. at 3247 Uan. 23, 1989); see also Twp. of W. Orange v. Whitman, 8 F. 
Supp. 2d 408, 433 n.15 (D.NJ. 1998) (in camera review of medical histories of 
allegedly dangerous residents, in lawsuit by township to prevent operation of 
group homes). 
57. H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 30. 
58. 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(c) (4)-(5) (2006). 
59. 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(c)(l). 
60. See infra Part V. 
61. 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(c) (2)-(3). 
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frequently in federally-funded housing developments that 
require or prefer tenants with handicaps.62 
2. Case Authority 
In interpreting the no-inquiry regulation, the most-com-
monly cited case is Cason v. R.ochester Housing Authority.63 Cason 
concerns a public housing authority that screened applicants for 
an "ability to live independently, or to live independently with 
minimal aid."64 Applicants were required to list their medical 
conditions and submit to an in-home evaluation conducted by a 
housing authority employee.65 If deemed necessary by the hous-
ing authority, these procedures were supplemented by a nursing 
evaluation "during which a variety of specific questions concern-
ing the applicant's disability, personal hygiene and ability to live 
independently [were] asked."66 
The court found, as the housing authority had conceded, 
that the housing authority's practices were "clearly at odds" with 
the regulation.67 The exception related to "the requirements of 
ownership or tenancy" did not apply: federal regulations set forth 
twelve tenant obligations, and none of those obligations was 
related to a person's ability to live independently.68 Ultimately, 
the court enjoined the public housing authority from making 
inquiries into an applicant's ability to live independently.69 
In subsequent cases, courts have clarified how the no-inquiry 
regulation coexists with publicly-funded housing. The no-inquiry 
regulation does not invalidate federal funding laws that allow a 
62. See, e.g., Implementation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 
1988, 53 Fed. Reg. 44992, 45001 (Nov. 7, 1988) (discussing subsidized housing 
in release of proposed no-inquiry regulations); Implementation of the Fair 
Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 54 Fed. Reg. 3232, 3246 Qan. 23, 1989) 
(discussing subsidized housing in release of final no-inquiry regulations); see 
also United States v. Forest Dale, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 954 (N.D. Tex. 1993) (hold-
ing receipt of federal funds requires apartment building to house only elderly 
tenants, but does not allow discrimination against applicants with handicaps). 
63. Cason v. Rochester Hous. Auth., 748 F. Supp. 1002 (W.D.N.Y. 1990); 
see also Settlement Agreement and Consent Order, Dept. Hous. & Urban Dev. v. 
Wilmette Real Est. & Mgmt. Co., No. 05-98-0148-8, (H.U.D.A.LJ. Oct. 3, 2000), 
2000 WL 1478457 (consent order against real estate management company, 
based on company's inquiries to applicants as to their ability to live 
independently). 
64. Cason, 748 F. Supp. at 1004. 
65. Id. at 1005. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. at 1008-09. 
68. Id.; see 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(£) (2006) (twelve obligations of public hous-
ing tenants). 
69. Cason, 748 F. Supp. at 1011. 
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landlord to prefer applicants with certain types of disabilities, 70 
although the right to prefer certain disabilities does not justify 
screening for an applicant's ability to live independently.71 
Exceptions to the no-inquiry regulation are construed nar-
rowly. In a case decided by the Maine Supreme Court, a feder-
ally subsidized housing project was limited by the federal funding 
to elderly or disabled tenants. Although the housing project thus 
was allowed to require verification of an applicant's disability, the 
project could not require a physician's statement describing the 
applicant's medical condition.72 
In a case involving a similar fact pattern-a housing project 
limited to elderly or disabled tenants-a federal district court in 
California emphasized that a landlord's inquiries should be as 
restricted as possible: 
[T]he legislative history of the [Fair Housing Amendments 
Act of 1988] and the HUD regulations show that an appli-
cant's privacy rights are to be preserved to the extent possi-
ble and that a landlord should use the least invasive means 
necessary to verify an applicant's qualifications .... 
Although a landlord may make necessary inquiries to 
determine an applicant's qualifications for tenancy, the 
landlord may not inquire into the nature and extent of an 
applicant's or tenant's disabilities beyond that necessary to 
determine eligibility.73 
70. See Beckert v. Our Lady of Angels Apts., Inc., 192 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 
1999) (holding that the National Housing Act allows landlord to admit appli-
cants with physical disabilities but reject those with chronic mental illness, such 
as the applicant with a "mental-schizo" condition in this case). 
71. Seejainniney v. Maximum Indep. Living, No. 00CV0879, memo. of op. 
(N.D. Ohio Feb. 9, 2001) (holding that the Cranston-Gonzalez National Afford-
able Housing Act allows landlord to prefer applicants with "similar disabilities" 
but does not allow him to reject applicants based on their inability to live inde-
pendently), http:/ /www.bazelon.org/issues/housing/ cases/janniney_v _maxin-
dliv.pdf. 
72. Robards v. Cotton Mill Assocs., 713 A.2d 952 (Me. 1998). The trial 
court had considered two exceptions: the exception for a dwelling reserved for 
persons with handicaps, as discussed in this article's text, and, in addition, the 
exception for "an applicant's ability to meet the requirements of ownership or 
tenancy." The trial court made the dubious conclusion that this second excep-
tion allowed the housing project to inquire into the applicant's ability to care 
for himself and an apartment. This issue was not appealed, and thus was not 
addressed by the Maine Supreme Court. Id. at 954. 
73. Niederhauser v. Independence Square Hous., 4 Fair Housing-Fair 
Lending Cases (Aspen Law & Bus.) ,r 16,305.1, at ,r 16,305.5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 
1998). 
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III. FHA PROTECTS LONG-TERM CA.RE RESIDENTS 
A. Case Law 
The case law is clear: the FHA applies to long-term care facil-
ities. The provision-or non-provision-of services is close to 
irrelevant in determining whether a particular building is subject 
to the FHA. The line instead is drawn based on whether the 
building serves as a home or, on the other extreme, as a transi-
tory resting place. 74 
Specificallr, the FHA applies only if the building in question 
is a "dwelling," 5 which is defined in pertinent part as "any build-
ing, structure, or portion thereof which is occupied as, or 
designed or intended for occupancy as, a residence by one or 
more families." 76 The term "family" explicitly is defined to 
include "a single individual."77 
The term "residence," however, is not defined within the 
FHA; in the absence of a statutory definition, courts have looked 
to the dictionary for guidance. An oft-cited dictionary definition 
(first employed by a court in 1975) describes "residence" as "a 
temporary or permanent dwelling place, abode or habitation to 
which one intends to return as distinguished from the place of 
temporary sojourn or transient visit."78 Numerous courts have 
used this same definition. 79 
In identifying those buildings that are not considered resi-
dences, the key definitional words are the nouns ("sojourn" or 
"visit") rather than the adjectives ("temporary" or "transient"). A 
hotel or motel, if intended for use solely by short-stay travelers, is 
not considered a "dwelling" under the FHA.80 Nonetheless, tern-
74. See, e.g., Conn. Hosp. v. New London, 129 F. Supp. 2d 123, 132 (D. 
Conn. 2001). 
75. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)-(f) (3) (2000) (proscribing various discrimi-
natory acts relating to sale or rental of a "dwelling," or relating to "the provision 
of services or facilities in connection" with such a "dwelling"). 
76. Id. § 3602(b) (emphasis added). 
77. Id. § 3602(c). 
78. United States v. Hughes Mem'l Home, 396 F. Supp. 544, 549 (W.D. 
Va. 1975) (FHA applies to 'residential center' for "dependent, neglected or 
needy children"). 
79. See, e.g., United States v. Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d 877, 881 
(3d Cir. 1990); Casa Marie, Inc. v. Super. Ct. of P.R., 988 F.2d 252, 257 (1st Cir. 
1993); Hovsons, Inc. v. Brick, 89 F.3d 1096, 1102 (3rd Cir. 1996); Home Quest 
Mortg., L.L.C. v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 340 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1184 (D. Kan. 
2004) (" [C]ourts have widely followed the definition of this term as first set 
forth in United States v. Hughes Memorial Home."). 
80. See Patel v. Holley House Motels, 483 F. Supp. 374, 381 (S.D. Ala. 
1979) (citing dictionary definition from United States v. Hughes Mem'l Home). A 
jail cell also is not considered a dwelling, although in that instance the exclu-
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porary housing is liberally recognized as a "dwelling" if the per-
son has nowhere else to live or, more generally, that the housing 
in question is "home" for at least the short term. Courts rightly 
cite the FHA's remedial purpose, as well as the common-sense 
proposition that the FHA's protections are particularly important 
for those persons on the margins of the housing market.81 
Homeless shelters are generally considered dwellings,82 as 
are farmworker camps.83 In reference to homeless shelters, a 
federal district court pointed out: 
[T] he homeless are not visitors or those on a temporary 
sojourn in the sense of motel guests. Although the Shelter 
is not designed to be a place of permanent residence, it 
cannot be said that the people who live there do not 
intend to return-they have nowhere else to go. As recog-
nized by the Hughes and Baxter courts, 84 the length of time 
one expects to live in a particular place does [sic] is not the 
exclusive factor in determining whether the place is a resi-
dence or a "dwelling." Because the people who live in the 
Shelter have nowhere else to "return to," the Shelter is 
sion from FHA coverage is due not to shortness of stay, but to the incompatibil-
ity of housing rights with incarceration. Garcia v. Condarco, 114 F. Supp. 2d 
1158, 1161-63 (D.N.M. 2000); Gold v. Griego, Civ. No. 99-1137 DJS/WWD, 
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14897, at *6-*8 (D.N.M. Feb. 22, 2000). 
81. See, e.g., Hovsons, Inc., 89 F.3d at 1105-06; Casa Marie, Inc., 988 F.2d 
at 257; New London, 129 F. Supp. 2d at 132-33; Villegas v. Sandy Farms, Inc., 929 
F. Supp. 1324, 1328 (D. Or. 1996); Woods v. Foster, 884 F. Supp. 1169, 1173-74 
(N.D. Ill. 1995). 
82. See, e.g., Turning Point v. Caldwell, 74 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(assuming without discussion that FHA applies to homeless shelter); Support 
Ministries for Persons with AIDS, Inc. v. Waterford, 808 F. Supp. 120 (N.D.N.Y. 
1992) (assuming without discussion that FHA applies to residence for homeless 
persons with AIDS); Stewart B. McKinney Found., Inc. v. Town Plan & Zoning 
Comm'n, 790 F. Supp. 1197 (D. Conn. 1992) (assuming without discussion that 
FHA applies to residence for persons with AIDS who are homeless or at risk of 
becoming homeless). But see Johnson v. Dixon, 786 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 
1991) ("It is, moreover, doubtful if 'emergency overnight shelter,' as the Dis-
trict conceives itself to be providing, i.e., a place of overnight repose and safety 
for persons whose only alternative is to sleep in alleys or doorways, can be char-
acterized as a 'dwelling' within the meaning of the Act, even if it may seem like 
home to them."). 
83. See Lauer Farms v. Waushara County Bd. of Adjustment, 986 F. Supp. 
544, 559 (E.D. Wis. 1997); Vill,egas, 929 F. Supp. at 1328. See also Hernandez v. 
Ever Fresh Co., 923 F. Supp. 1305, 1308 (D. Or. 1996) (concluding with little 
analysis that FHA applies to farm labor camp). 
84. "Hughes" is United States v. Hughes Mem'l Home, the case which first 
employed the dictionary definition of "residence." "Baxter" is the subsequently-
cited case of Baxter v. City of Belleville, 720 F. Supp. 720 (S.D. Ill. 1989), in 
which an AIDS hospice was found subject to the FHA. See infra note 90. 
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their residence in the sense that they live there and not in 
any other place.85 
Similar reasoning applies in the farmworker cases. During 
the approximately five months of the growing season, 
farmworker camps or cabins are considered "dwellings" because 
they are "home" for farmworkers and their families, even if the 
farmworkers maintain homes in another state.86 
Many cases concern claims by group homes, which are small 
residential facilities for non-elderly adults.87 Courts routinely. 
conclude that a group home is a "dwelling" under the FHA; 
more often than not, courts reach this conclusion implicitly, 
accepting the application of the FHA as a given.88 In one case in 
which the issue was addressed explicitly, a court noted the per-
versity of any interpretation in which the provision of services 
would negate the FHA's applicability: 
The court declines to accept the argument that, because 
plaintiffs live in an environment that is conducive to the 
recovery process, that environment changes the nature of 
the place where they live from a residence to that of a reha-
bilitative facility. If this were the case, then any group liv-
ing arrangement that facilitated recovery of a handicapped 
person would lose the protections of the FHA.89 
Following such reasoning, both explicit and implicit, courts 
routinely have applied the FHA to hospices90 and nursing 
homes.91 In affirming the FHA's applicability to a nursing home, 
85. Woods, 884 F. Supp. at 1173-74. 
86. See Lauer Farms, 986 F. Supp. at 559; ViUegas, 929 F. Supp. at 1328. 
87. A resident of a group home is likely to have a developmental disabil-
ity, mental illness, or brain injury, or for some other reason to need a super-
vised living environment. 
88. See, e.g., Edmonds v. Oxford House, 514 U.S. 725 (1995) (implicitly 
applying the FHA to a group home); NJ. Coal. of Rooming & Boarding House 
Owners v. Mayor of Asbury Park, 152 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 1998) (implicitly apply-
ing the Fair Housing Act Amendment (FHA) to a rooming and boarding 
house); Growth Horizons, Inc. v. Del. County, 983 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(implicitly applying the FHA to a community living arrangement); Familystyle 
of St. Paul, Inc. v. St. Paul, 923 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1991) (implicitly applying the 
FHA to a group home). 
89. New London, 129 F. Supp. 2d at 132 (discussing group housing for 
persons undergoing outpatient treatment or substance abuse). 
90. See Baxter v. Belleville, 720 F. Supp. 720, 731 (S.D. Ill. 1989) (denial 
of special use permit for a hospice for persons with AIDS); see also Ass'n of 
Relatives & Friends of AIDS Patients v. Regulations & Permits Admin., 740 F. 
Supp. 95 (D.P.R. 1990) (for examples of courts denying a special use permit for 
hospice for persons with AIDS). 
91. See, e.g., Lapid-Laurel, L.L.C. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 284 F.3d 
442 (3d Cir. 2002) (affirming zoning board's refusal to grant variance for nurs-
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the Third Circuit noted that "[t]o the handicapped elderly per-
sons who would reside there, [the nursing home] would be their 
home, very often for the rest of their lives."92 
In accord with this line of reasoning, courts without excep-
tion have found assisted living facilities subject to the FHA. In 
each case, the FHA was invoked to challenge a zoning decision; 
in none of these cases did the defendants challenge the facility's 
status as a "dwelling" under the FHA.93 Like a nursing home, the 
ing home); United States v. Puerto Rico, 764 F. Supp. 220 (D.P.R. 1991) (dis-
cussing Puerto Rican agency's refusal to grant permit for operation of nursing 
home); Caron v. Pawtucket, 307 F. Supp. 2d 364 (D.R.I. 2004) (denying long-
time retirement home licensure to operate as a nursing home); United States v. 
Lorantffy Care Ctr., 999 F. Supp. 1037 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (about U.S. Justice 
Department alleging racial discrimination by nursing home operator in viola-
tion of the FHA). The Lorantffy opinion never classifies the Lorantffy Care 
Center, but the Lorantffy Care Center is identified as a nursing home in the 
press release of the filing of the action, and on the Medicare program's Nursing 
Home Compare website. Press Release, Department of Justice, Justice Depart-
ment Sues Nursing Home for Allegedly Refusing to Rent to African-Americans 
(Feb. 5, 1997), http://www.usdoj.gov/ opa/pr/1997 /February97 /054cr.htm; 
Nursing Home Compare Website, http://www.medicare.gov/NHCompare/ 
(click on "Search for Nursing Home by Name"; then type in "Lorantffy" to box 
"Nursing Home Name" and select "Ohio - Eastern" for the box labeled "State/ 
Territory"; click on "Next Step"). 
92. Hovsons, Inc., 89 F.3d at 1102 (denying zoning variance for nursing 
home). 
93. See Smith & Lee Assocs. v. Taylor, 102 F.3d 781, 785 (6th Cir. 1996) 
(discussing zoning rules requiring neighborhood approval for operation of 
adult foster care home "hous[ing] six elderly disabled residents who suffer from 
Alzheimer's disease and other forms of dementia, organic brain syndrome, and 
other ailments"); Akridge v. Moultrie, No. 6:04 CV 31 (HL), 2006 WL 292179 
(M.D. Ga. Feb. 7, 2006) ( discussing alleged zoning violation in operation of an 
assisted living facility); Barry v. Rollinsford, No. Civ. 02-127M, 2003 WL 
22290248 (D.N.H. Oct. 6, 2003) (refusing to grant exception to build an 
assisted living facility); Assisted Living Assocs. v. Moorestown Twp., 996 F. Supp. 
409 (D.NJ. 1998) (discussing "spot-zoning" to prohibit operation ofan assisted 
living facility); Sunrise Dev., Inc. v. Huntington, 62 F. Supp. 2d 762, 766 
(E.D.N.Y. 1999) (discussing rezoning to prohibit construction of a "congregate 
care [facility] ... provid[ing] such services as assistance with bathing, dressing, 
bathroom usage, taking medicine, and other similar daily living activities"); 
Town & Country Adult Living, Inc. v. Mt. Kisco, No. 02 Civ. 444(LTS), 2003 WL 
21219794 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2003) (denying variance to expand an assisted liv-
ing facility). See also Weinstein v. Cherry Oaks Ret. Cmty., 917 P.2d 336, 338 
(Colo. Ct. App. 1996) (discussing application of the Colorado Fair Housing Act, 
recognized as "almost identical" to the federal FHA to a "personal care board-
ing home," which was at the time the term used in Colorado for an assisted 
living facility, in discrimination claim brought by resident against facility). 
One anomaly in this line of authority is a case in which a building was to 
contain housing for physically disabled older adults in the upper floors, along 
with an adult day care facility on the ground floor. Because the adult day care 
facility was to provide services to the entire community-not just to the build-
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assisted living facility was accepted by the parties and the court as 
"home" for its residents. 
Notably, virtually all of the cases discussed in this section 
relate to zoning or similar disputes. The ubiquitous issue in dis-
pute is whether the property owner (or lessee, in some instances) 
has the right to operate a particular type of facility on the 
property.94 
B. Administrative Commentary 
The case law's consensus-the FHA applies to long-term 
care facilities-is supported by two federal administrative pro-
nouncements. In the 1991 release of ADA regulations, the Jus-
tice Department addressed the relationship between the ADA 
and the FHA.95 The ADA applies to "public accommodations," 
including a "service establishment" such as a hospital, or a "social 
service center establishment" such as a senior citizen center or a 
homeless shelter.96 Furthermore, unlike the FHA, the ADA's 
"public accommodations" classification apglies to hotels, motels, 
and other short-term "places of lodging."9 
The Justice Department explained that a residential facility 
with services, such as a nursing home or an assisted living facility, 
might be covered under both the ADA and the FHA.98 Under 
the ADA, the inquiry focuses on whether a residential facility "is 
intended for or permits short-term stays [so as to be categorized 
as a "place of lodging"], or if it can appropriately be categorized 
as a service establishment or as a social service establishment."99 
The FHA inquiry is to be independent, based on the FHA stan-
ing's residents-the Ninth Circuit concluded that the FHA's accommodation 
requirement did not apply to the adult day care facility. Gamble v. Escondido, 
104 F.3d 300,307 (9th Cir. 1997); 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (1988) (detailing 
FHA's accommodation requirement). 
94. See, e.g., Hovsons, Inc., 89 F.3d at 1102 (discussing property owner's 
right to operate a nursing home); Assisted Living Assocs., 996 F. Supp. at 414-16 
(discussing property owner's right to operate an assisted living facility); Turning 
Point, 74 F.3d 941 (discussing property owner's right to operate a homeless 
shelter). 
95. 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B (2006). 
96. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F), (K) (2000). 
97. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(A). 
98. 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B at 688 (2006) (referring to "nursing homes 
[and] residential care facilities"). 
99. Id. See also Wagner, 49 F.3d at 1006 n.3 (stating that there was a viable 
claim against nursing home under the ADA); Lindgren v. Camphill Viii. Minn., 
Inc., No. Civ.00-2771 RHK/RLE, 2002 WL 1332796, at *5-*7 (D. Minn.June 13, 
2002) (refusing to grant summary judgment against ADA claim made by autistic 
resident against "family-style" community). 
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dards. 100 Thus, enactment of the ADA-and more specifically, 
the ADA's explicit coverage of "service establishments" and 
"social service center establishments"-did not indicate any 
intent by Congress to reduce the FHA's application to residential 
facilities that provide services. 
Three years later, HUD issued supplementary guidelines to 
address the FHA's accessibility requirements for new construc-
tion. 101 In response to a question regarding application of the 
FHA to continuing care facilities-defined as facilities that 
"incorporate housing, health care, and other types of services"-
HUD explained that such a facility's status as a "'dwelling' ... 
depend[ed] on whether the facility [was] to be used as a resi-
dence for more than a brief period of time."102 Three factors 
were to be considered: 
(1) the length of time persons stay in the project; 
(2) whether policies are in effect at the project that are 
designed and intended to encourage or discourage 
occupants from forming an expectation and intent to 
continue to occupy space at the project; and 
( 3) the nature of the services provided by or at the 
project. 103 
These factors are consistent with case law in focusing on the 
length and nature of the stay in determining whether a particular 
facility is subject to the FHA. 104 Provision of services is only rele-
vant, per factor number 3, to the extent that the service sheds 
light on whether a resident is meant to be in a facility for a short 
period of time. 
It is noteworthy too that the FHA itself contemplates that 
some "dwellings" will provide services. A central FHA provision 
prohibits discrimination "in the provision of services or facilities 
in connection with such dwelling." 105 Discrimination is defined 
to include "a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in 
rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations 
may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use 
and ertjoy a dwelling."106 Of course, it is not obvious that these 
100. 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B at 688. 
101. Supplement to Notice of Fair Housing Accessibility Guidelines, 59 
Fed. Reg. 33362 Qune 28, 1994). See also 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f) (3) (C) (2000) 
(detailing FHA's new construction requirements). 
102. Supplement to Notice of Fair Housing Accessibility Guidelines, 59 
Fed. Reg. at 33364. 
103. Id. 
104. See supra Part IV. 
105. 42 u.s.c. § 3604(f) (2). 
106. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f) (3) (B) (emphasis added). 
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"services" include the types of services provided by long-term 
care facilities. Arguably, the terms "services" and "facilities" are 
meant to refer to such routine amenities as lawnmowing and 
laundry rooms. On the other hand, nothing in the statute or the 
regulations compels such a limited reading of either word. 107 
IV. REGULATORY ExcEPTIONS Do NoT At.Low LONG-TERM 
CARE FACILITY TO OBTAIN APPLICANTS' MEDICAL INFORMATION, 
UNLESS FACILITY GIVES ADMISSION PRIORITY 
TO APPLICANTS WITH HANDICAPS 
A. Relevant Exceptions 
1. Handicap as Prerequisite 
As discussed above, the no-inquiry regulation contains five 
exceptions. 108 Of these five exceptions, two related exceptions 
are particularly relevant to the types of inquiries typically made 
by long-term care facilities. 109 One exception applies when a 
handicap or particular type of handicap is a prerequisite for admis-
sion; the other applies when a handicap or particular type of 
handicap gives priority for admission.11° 
The "handicap as prerequisite" exception allows an 
"[i]nquiry to determine whether an applicant is qualified for a 
dwelling available only to persons with handicaps or to persons 
with a particular type of handicap." 111 In interpreting this provi-
sion, the little available legal authority is focused generally on 
situations in which subsidized housing has been reserved for per-
sons with handicaps. In the proposed regulations' release, HUD 
explained: 
For example, some Federal and State housing programs 
are designed for, and occupied by, persons with handicaps. 
Only persons with handicaps are eligible to live in such 
dwellings. The owner or operator of such a housing facil-
ity may inquire of applicants to determine whether they 
have a handicap for the purpose of determining 
eligibility. 112 
In the release of final regulations, HUD again emphasized 
subsidized housing but, in response to various public comments, 
107. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.65(b) ( 4) (2006) (referring without elaboration 
to "privileges, services, or facilities"). 
108. See supra Part III.B. l. 
109. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(c) (2). 
110. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(c) (2)-(3). 
111. 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(c)(2). 
112. Implementation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 53 
Fed. Reg. 44992, 45001 (Nov. 7, 1988). 
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also addressed inquiries made to determine eligibility for non-
subsidized housing: 
A privately owned unsubsidized housing facility may law-
fully restrict occupancy to persons with handicaps. The 
owner or operator of such a housing facility must therefore 
be permitted to inquire of applicants to determine 
whether they have a handicap for the purpose of determin-
ing eligibility.113 
Case authority is slight. As discussed previously, a housing 
provider is permitted to admit only applicants with certain types 
of handicaps-rejecting applicants with other types of handi-
caps-if a government subsidy has authorized such criteria.114 
2. Handicap as Priority 
Administrative and case authority are equally limited for the 
second exception: when "a priority [is] available to persons with 
handicaps or to persons with a particular type of handicap."115 
In the proposed regulation's release, HUD offered an unsurpris-
ing example of how a handicap might qualify an applicant for 
priority: 
A housing provider may choose to offer some or all of its 
units to persons with handicaps on a priority basis and may 
inquire whether applicants qualify for such a priority. For 
example, a housing provider may offer accessible units to 
persons with mobility impairments on a priority basis and 
may ask applicants whether they have a mobility impair-
ment which would qualify them for such a priority.116 
HUD's discussion in the final regulations' release is almost 
identical, but with one additional instruction. The discussion 
again offers the example of a priority for mobility impairments, 
then adds the admonition that a housing provider "may not in 
such circumstances ask applicants whether they have other types 
of impairments."117 
113. Implementation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 54 
Fed. Reg. 3232, 3246 Uan. 23, 1989). 
114. See supra Part III.B.2 and notes 69-70. 
115. 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(c)(3) (2006). 
116. Implementation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 53 
Fed. Reg. 44992, 45001 (Nov. 7, 1988). 
117. Implementation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 54 
Fed. Reg. 3232, 3246 Uan. 23, 1989). 
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B. R.egulatory Exceptions Do Not Apply to 
Long-Term Care Admissions 
1. Handicap Not Required 
Perhaps surprisingly, a handicap is not required for admis-
sion to a nursing home. As a practical matter, a nursing home 
resident without a handicap likely would not qualify for coverage 
from either the Medicare or Medicaidus programs-because the 
nursing home care would be considered unnecessary-but a per-
son without a handicap could pay privately for nursing home 
care. 119 Although a nursing home has the right to evict a resi-
dent who does not need nursing home care, the facility has no 
obligation to do so. 120 In short, a nursing home is allowed to 
admit and retain privately-paying persons who have no handicap 
whatsoever. 121 
For the same reasons, nursing homes by and large are not 
limited to persons having "a particular type of handicap."122 
Since a nursing home generally can admit persons without 
handicaps, it cannot be said that admission requires a "particular 
type" of handicap.123 
118. The Medicare program pays for certain health care expenses for per-
sons who are at least age sixty-five or disabled. In general, Medicare coverage 
requires that the person, or the person's spouse, has worked an adequate num-
ber of calendar quarters in employment subject to federal payroll deductions. 
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395hh (2000 & Supp. III 2003) (covering Medicare). 
As relevant to this Article, the Medicaid program also pays for certain 
health care expenses of persons who are at least sixty-five years old or disabled. 
Medicaid eligibility is based not on work history but on financial need. See 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396v (2000) (covering Medicaid). 
119. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395f(a) (2) (B) (2000) (pertaining to Medicare); 42 
C.F.R. §§ 409.31-409.35 (2005) (pertaining to Medicare); 42 C.F.R. § 440.40 
(2005) (pertaining to Medicaid). 
120. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(c) (2) (A) (ii) (stating that eviction is author-
ized if "the resident's health has improved sufficiently so the resident no longer 
needs the services provided by the facility"); 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(c) (2) (A) (ii) 
(stating same language quoted above). 
121. As a practical matter, of course, a person without a handicap has no 
reason to live in a nursing home, but this practical reality does not alter the fact 
that a nursing home is not prohibited from admitting or retaining persons with-
out handicaps. 
122. 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(c) (2) (2006). 
123. Some nursing homes are licensed specifically for, or claim special 
expertise in, the care of residents with dementia or a similar cognitive disorder. 
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN.§§ 20-10-1501 to 1505 (2005) (containing the Arkansas 
Alzheimer's Special Care Standards Act); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETI' CoDE 
§ 1422.5(a) (2) (D) (West 2000) (identifying facilities with a "SPECIAL CARE UNIT 
or program for people with Alzheimer's disease and other dementias"); W. VA. 
CoDE ANN. §§ 16-5R-l to 6 (LexisNexis 2006) (containing the West Virginia 
Alzheimer's Special Care Standards Act). This specialization does not alter this 
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These same conclusions hold for assisted living facilities also. 
Like nursing home law, assisted living law does not require a 
handicap as a condition of admission. Although "assisted living" 
is defined in state law as including the provision or availability of 
services, residents are not required to need or use services.124 
On occasion, in fact, assisted living definitions state explicitly that 
an assisted living resident may not need the available services. In 
Kansas and Oklahoma, for example, a resident's desire for per-
sonal care may be due to "functional impairments" or "by 
choice."125 
Again, public funding sources generally will not require that 
all residents have handicaps, unless the assisted living facility 
itself is a subsidized housing project that requires a handicap as a 
condition of tenancy.126 The Medicaid program in some states 
may pay for services provided in an assisted living facility-
through either a personal care services program or, more fre-
quently, a home and community-based services (HCBS) waiver-
but these programs do not set assisted living standards. 127 
Although federal law purports to require state Medicaid pro-
grams to establish "adequate standards" for providers of HCBS 
services, this requirement in practice means little more than 
requiring Medicaid-certified assisted living facilities to obtain an 
assisted living license-the same license required of all assisted 
living providers. 128 Nothing in Medicaid law prohibits an assisted 
Article's analysis, because the specialization laws do not require a handicap or 
"particular type" of handicap as a condition of admission. 
124. See, e.g., Cow. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 25-27-102(1.3) (West 2001 & Supp. 
2006) (defining "assisted living residence"); NJ. AnMIN. CODE§ 8:36-1.3 (2006) 
( defining "assisted living residence"). 
125. KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 39-923(a) (5) (2000); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-
890.2(1) (West 2004). 
As a practical matter, a person without a handicap generally does not move 
into assisted living. See supra Part III.A (defining "handicap" broadly). See also 
KANE & WILSON, supra note 31, at xiii (finding that a study showed "[a]ssisted 
living tended to attract tenants more disabled than the group which operators 
targeted initially"). Assisted living developers have found that "the market for 
assisted living among people who are tired of keeping up a house and just need 
a little help is rather limited." Id. at 116. 
126. See MOLLICA, supra note 15, at 1-67 to 1-68 (HUD subsidies for 
assisted living facilities). 
127. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396d(a)(24) (personal care services), 1396n(c) 
(HCBS waiver) (2000); MOLLICA, supra note 15, at 1-41 to 1-46 (personal care 
services and waiver services; personal care services identified as "state plan ser-
vices"); KATHRYN G. ALLEN, UNITED STATES GENERAL AccouNTING OFFICE, FED-
ERAL OVERSIGHT OF GROWING MEDICAID HOME AND COMMUNI'IY-BASED WAIVERS 
SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED (2003), http:/ /www.gao.gov/new.items/ 
d03576.pdf. 
128. 42 C.F.R. § 441.302(a)(l) (2005). 
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living facility from admitting an applicant without a handicap, 
assuming that the assisted living costs are covered by a non-Medi-
caid source. 
As is similarly true for nursing homes, assisted living facilities 
are not limited to persons having "a particular type of handi-
cap. "129 Because an assisted living facility can admit persons 
without handicaps, admission certainly is not limited to persons 
with a "particular type" of handicap.130 
2. No Priority for Handicap 
Although long-term care facilities are not reserved for per-
sons with handicaps or particular types of handicaps, there is a 
colorable-but ultimately unsatisfactory-argument that a facil-
ity necessarily gives priority to persons with handicaps or (in lim-
ited circumstances) a particular type of handicap. The raison 
d'etre of long-term care is providing necessary services for persons 
with handicaps. 131 Proper operation of a long-term care facility 
requires the admission of persons with handicaps and, for that 
reason, it might be said that persons with handicaps have priority 
for admission. 132 
129. 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(c) (2) (2006). See Beckert, 192 F.3d at 606-07 
(referring to National Housing Act allowing landlord to serve residents with 
physical disabilities, but rejectng applicants with chronic mental illness). 
130. Assisted living facilities also are similar to nursing homes in that 
some assisted living facilities are licensed specifically for, or claim special exper-
tise in, the care of residents with dementia or a similar cognitive disorder. See, 
e.g., ALA. AnMIN. CooE r. 420-5-20-.01 (2)( q) (2006) ( defining a specialty care 
assisted living facility as a facility that is "specially licensed and staffed to permit 
it to care for residents with a degree of cognitive impairment that would ordina-
rily make them ineligible for admission or continued stay in an assisted living 
facility"); N.Y. Pus. HEALTH LAw § 4655(5) (McKinney 2002) (requiring addi-
tional certification for any assisted living facility "that advertises or markets itself 
as serving individuals with special needs, including, but not limited to, individu-
als with dementia or cognitive impairments"); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETI CooE 
§ 1569.627 (West 2006) (requiring certain disclosures from facilities claiming 
specialization in dementia care); DEL. REcs. § 40-300-005, § 63.6 (2007) (same). 
See also supra note 123 ( discussing nursing homes specializing in dementia 
care). As was true in the case of nursing homes, the specialization laws pertain-
ing to assisted living do not require a handicap or a "particular type" of handi-
cap as a condition of admission. 
131. See supra Part I. 
132. In most situations, this priority is moot on a practical level. As dis-
cussed above, admission to a long-term care facility is of interest only to persons 
with handicaps or-to a limited extent in the assisted living context-to per-
sons without handicaps who can anticipate having a handicap within the fore-
seeable future. See supra Part V.B.2 and note 123. Long-term care facilities 
generally are not required to apply a priority system in practice; the nature of 
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This interpretation appears compatible with the policy 
underlying the FHA and the no-inquiry regulation. The FHA 
broadly prohibits discrimination on the basis of handicap. 133 To 
limit opportunities for discrimination, the no-inquiry regulation 
prophylactically prohibits housing providers from inquiring into 
an applicant's handicap. In short, the FHA and the no-inquiry 
regulation are meant to benefit persons with handicaps. Consis-
tent with this intent, the regulation's exceptions identify situa-
tions in which a handicap might be a benefit-used not to bar or 
restrict admission, but instead to facilitate an applicant's 
admission. 
The no-inquiry regulation's subsection (c) (2) grants an 
exception when a handicap is required for admission. Subsec-
tion (c) (3) arguably is a catch-all provision that covers those situ-
ations in which a handicap is not required but nonetheless 
creates a priority. Subsection (c)(3) could be read broadly, con-
sistent with Congressional intent, to include those situations in 
which housing is designed for, or intended for use by, persons 
with handicaps. 134 Persons with handicaps thus could be consid-
ered to have priority for admission to long-term care facilities, 
whether or not a particular facility has formally adopted such a 
priority. 
Following this reasoning, priority for a "particular type" of 
handicap would be considered to be offered by long-term care 
facilities with formalized specializations.135 As cited earlier, some 
long-term care facilities follow state standards for specialization 
in the care of residents with dementia or similar cognitive disor-
ders.136 Formalized facility specializations generally vary from 
state to state and may include such specializations as mental 
health services or ventilator care. 137 
long-term care creates an applicant pool comprised overwhelmingly of persons 
with handicaps. 
133. 42 u.s.c. § 3604(£) (1 )-(2) (2000). 
134. See, e.g., City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 731 
(1995) (noting "the FHA's 'broad and inclusive' compass"); Havens Realty 
Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 380 (1982) (recognizing the "broad remedial 
intent of Congress" in the FHA). 
135. 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(c) (3) (2006). 
136. See supra Part V.B.2 and notes 123, 130. 
137. See, e.g., CAL. CooE REGs. tit. 22, § 72447 (2006) ("A SPECIAL TREAT-
MENT PROGRAM service distinct part means an identifiable and physically sepa-
rate unit of a skilled nursing facility or an entire skilled nursing facility which 
provides therapeutic programs to an identified mentally disordered population 
group."); N.H. CooE AoMIN. R. ANN. He-E 802.05(c)-(d) (2006) (special needs 
units, both behavioral and non-behavioral, for nursing homes; non-behavioral 
unit includes care for ventilator-dependent residents); NJ. AoMIN. CooE §§ 
8:33H-1.6(a) (specialized care beds for ventilator-dependent adult residents 
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Ultimately, however, these "presumed priority" arguments 
are not tenable. The arguments are premised on the presump-
tion that long-term care facilities will prefer applicants with 
handicaps, but, on at least some occasions, the opposite is true. 
A facility may have a financial incentive to prefer admission of a 
person without a handicap, in order to limit expenses, or to 
maintain an image of a facility for "active" seniors.138 For similar 
reasons, a facility with a specialization may see a financial or 
operational advantage in admitting an applicant who does not 
need the specialized services. 
Also, presuming a priority for handicaps could be counter-
productive for persons with handicaps. In advancing the "pre-
sumed priority" argument, this Article has pointed out that it 
would be consistent with the FHA and the no-inquiry regulation 
for a provider to grant priority to applicants with handicaps. Sig-
nificantly, however, this reasoning does not change the fact that 
a facility is not required to offer such a priority. A facility could 
obtain an applicant's medical information based on the pre-
sumption that a handicap would give priority, but could use the 
information to discriminate against applicants with handicaps. 
In relevant part, the no-inquiry regulation refers to "a prior-
ity availabl,e to persons with handicaps or to persons with a partic-
ular type of handicap."139 It is insufficient that the long-term 
care system generally would benefit if facilities were to give prior-
ity to persons with handicaps, or that in practice most facilities 
do offer such priority. The FHA was enacted because housing 
providers do not always act consistently with good public policy, 
and some discriminate against persons with handicaps. If a pri-
ority does not exist in practice-in large part because it is not 
legally required-then the priority-based exceptions do not 
apply. 
and for "residents with severe behavior management problems, such as combat-
ive, aggressive, and disruptive behaviors"), 8:85-2.21 ("special care nursing facil-
ity" for residents requiring "extended rehabilitation and/ or complex care") 
(2006). See also CAL. CooE REcs. tit. 22, §§ 72443-72475 (encompassing stan-
dards for special treatment program service units). 
138. See, e.g., Wagner, 49 F.3d 1002 (a nursing home denying admission 
based on an applicant's Alzheimer's disease); Weinstein, 917 P.2d at 339 (a Colo-
rado Civil Rights Commission Administrative Law Judge concluding that a no-
wheelchair-in-dining-room policy was intended to maintain a "'disability-free' 
atmosphere"). See also KANE & WILSON, supra note 31, at 25 (Some facility oper-
ators prefer "healthy and fairly independent elderly," but, overall, operators 
generally attract a frailer-than-anticipated clientele.). 
139. 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(c)(3) (2006) (emphasis added). 
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V. To OBTAIN AccEss TO APPLICANTS' MEDICAL INFORMATION, 
FACILITIES WOULD ESTABLISH ADMISSION PRIORI'IY 
FOR APPLICANTS WITH HANDICAPS 
If HUD or private parties were to begin enforcing the no-
inquiry regulation against long-term care facilities, the facilities 
likely would feel forced by circumstances to change their policies 
in order to claim a regulatory exception. This Article has 
demonstrated that a facility otherwise does not have a right to 
demand medical information from applicants, because long-term 
care facilities are not limited to persons with handicaps and do 
not necessarily give admission priority based on handicaps. 
The key word in the preceding sentence is "necessarily." A 
long-term care facility may not be required to grant a handicap-
based priority, but, as cited earlier, it nonetheless may choose to 
offer such a priority.140 
An exception to the no-inquiry regulation is made in the 
case of "a priority available to persons with handicaps or to per-
sons with a particular type of handicap."141 Taking the initiative, 
a facility could claim this exception by establishing a priority for 
applicants with handicaps or a particular type of handicap. 
If the no-inquiry regulation actively were to be enforced 
against long-term care facilities, a facility would have great incen-
tives to establish such a priority. Without a priority, a facility 
would have no right to inquire into an applicant's medical condi-
tion, and would be flying blind when making admission deci-
sions. Given facilities' intense interest in applicants' medical 
conditions, the facilities would waste little time in declaring the 
necessary priorities. 
One unsettling scenario immediately suggests itself: the 
declared priorities would be shams, relevant only in justifying the 
facilities' intrusions into applicants' medical conditions. Specifi-
cally, facilities would declare a pro forma priority for persons 
with handicaps, and would use the priority to demand extensive 
disclosure of applicants' medical conditions and histories. 
This scenario is unduly pessimistic. In fact, a declared prior-
ity would benefit individuals with handicaps. Currently, long-
term care facilities generally have no obligation to prefer persons 
with handicaps, and on occasion may choose an applicant with-
out a handicap over one with a handicap. In such a fact pattern, 
140. See Implementation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 
53 Fed. Reg. 44992, 45001 (Nov. 7, 1988). See also Implementation of the Fair 
Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 54 Fed. Reg. 3232, 3246 (Jan. 23, 1989). 
141. 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(c)(3) (emphasis added). 
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a person with a handicap would benefit if the facility previously 
had adopted a priority for applicants with handicaps. 
A more wide-reaching benefit to applicants would be the 
limits placed on the medical information requested. Currently-
without enforcement of the no-inquiry regulation-long-term 
care facilities assume carte blanche access and routinely request 
voluminous documentation of applicants' medical conditions. 
Although some of the requested information is necessary to 
determine whether the facility is appropriate for an applicant, 
much of it is used less admirably to discriminate against appli-
cants with greater care needs. In making admission decisions, 
facilities routinely use preadmission software that projects each 
applicant's cost and revenue. 142 
Under the no-inquiry regulation, however, a facility should 
be able to inquire into an applicant's medical information only 
to the extent necessary. The FHA's letter and spirit counsel that 
any inquiry into a handicap should be as restricted as is practica-
ble. As noted by a federal district court, and quoted earlier in 
this Article, "an applicant's privacy rights are to be preserved to 
the extent possible and ... a landlord should use the least inva-
sive means necessary to verify an applicant's qualifications."143 
The relevant statutory and regulatory authority is buttressed 
by the previously-discussed rulings that allow a federally subsi-
dized housing program to require verification of an applicant's 
age or disability, but prohibit the program from requiring a 
more detailed physician's statement. 144 Similarly, HUD has 
emphasized that the right to inquire into one priority-creating 
handicap does not authorize a housing provider to make inquir-
ies regarding other medical issues.145 
VI. FHA ALLows F AGILITY TO OBTAIN MosT MEDICAL REcoRDs 
OF CURRENT RESIDENTS 
A. No-Inquiry Regulation Applies Explicitly to "Applicant" 
A remaining issue is the no-inquiry regulation's applicability 
to a current resident of a long-term care facility. The analysis of 
this issue is straightforward, dictated by the regulation's consis-
tent use of the term "applicant." The regulation refers to "an 
142. See, e.g., American Healthtech, supra note 2; ADL Data Systems, Inc., 
Pre-Admission, http:/ /www.adldata.com/Software/Registration/PreAdmit. 
html (last visited Feb.3, 2007). 
143. Niederhauser, supra note 73, at ,i 16,305.5. 
144. See supra Part III.B. l and notes 72-73 ( discussing limits to inquiries). 
145. Implementation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 54 
Fed. Reg. 3232, 3246 Qan. 23, 1989). 
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applicant for a dwelling, a person intending to reside in that 
dwelling after it is so sold, rented or made available, or any per-
son associated with that person."146 Furthermore, each of the 
regulation's five exceptions refers explicitly and exclusively to 
"an applicant," and introductory language specifies that the 
exceptions apply only if the "inquiries are made of all 
applicants. "147 
Notably, the term "applicant" is used only in the regulation's 
"no-inquiry" subsection. The remainder of 24 C.F.R. § 100.202 
refers more broadly to a "buyer or renter; [a] person residing in 
or intending to reside in that dwelling after it is so sold, rented, 
or made available; or [a]ny person associated with that 
person."148 
Also, as previously discussed, the no-inquiry regulation is 
based on analogous Section 504 regulations relating to pre-employ-
ment inquiries by an employer.149 If, as is the case, the Section 
504 regulations relate only to inquiries made of job applicants 
and not current employees, the FHA's analogous no-inquiry reg-
ulation reasonably can be interpreted to apply to rental appli-
cants (and related persons) but not to existing tenants. 
B. FHA Statutory Language Prohibits Inappropriate Inquiries 
Although the no-inquiry regulation does not apply to 
existing tenants, a landlord cannot inquire with impunity into an 
existing tenant's handicap. The FHA broadly prohibits handi-
cap-based discrimination "in the sale or rental [of] ... a dwell-
ing," or "in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of 
a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connec-
146. 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(c) (2006) (emphasis added). 
147. 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(c)(l)-(5). 
148. 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(a)-(b). 
149. See, e.g., supra Part III.B.l and note 54; 7 C.F.R. § 15b.15 (2006) 
(Agriculture Dept. regulations implementing Section 504); 24 C.F.R. § 8.13 
(2006) (HUD regulations implementing Section 504); 34 C.F.R. § 104.14 
(2006) (Education Dept. regulations implementing Section 504); and 45 C.F.R. 
§ 84.14 (2005) (HHS regulations implementing Section 504); see also Imple-
mentation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 53 Fed. Reg. 44992, 
45001 (Nov. 7, 1988) (FHA no-inquiry regulation drawn from Section 504 regu-
lations on pre-employment inquiries); Implementation of the Fair Housing 
Amendments Act of 1988, 54 Fed. Reg. 3232, 3246 (Jan. 23, 1989) (same). 
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tion with such dwelling." 150 In some circumstances, an inquiry 
into a tenant's handicap is unlawful under these standards.151 
A finding of discrimination is most likely to take place when 
a landlord crosses the line from inquiry into harassment. A land-
lord pushed past this line in the administrative case of HUD v. 
Williarns. 152 The landlord had called the tenant at 6:00 a.m., 
reporting that he (the landlord) had heard that the tenant had 
AIDS, and asking the tenant about the state of the tenant's 
health. 153 The administrative law judge concluded appropriately 
that the no-inquiry regulation did not apply-because the tenant 
was a "sitting tenant" rather than an "applicant"-but found that 
the landlord's inquiry had violated the FHA. 154 
The administrative law judge cited the House of Representa-
tives Report accompanying the FHA, as well as the preamble to 
the FHA regulations. 155 In the section cited by the administra-
tive law judge, the House Report noted that the FHA's "direct 
threat" provision-that nothing in the FHA requires that tenancy 
be offered to a person who would be a threat to others' health, 
safety, or personal property-does not authorize a landlord to 
ask "questions which would require the applicant or tenant to 
waive his right to confidentiality concerning his medical condi-
tion or history." 156 The preamble, as cited by the administrative 
law judge, "provides that a 'housing provider may judge handi-
capped persons on the same basis it judges all other applicants 
and residents,' and that the housing provider 'may not treat hand-
icapped applicants or tenants less favorably than other applicants 
or tenants.' "157 
The administrative law judge concluded that the landlord's 
early-morning call was a violation of the FHA and its regula-
tions-even if, as the opinion acknowledged, "the text of the stat-
ute and corresponding regulation leave some fog over the 
question of whether Congress meant to protect sitting tenants as 
150. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(£)(1)-(2) (2000); see 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(a)-(b) 
( corresponding language in regulations). 
151. See Cason, 748 F. Supp. at 1007-08 (inquiry into applicants' handi-
caps improper under both no-inquiry regulation and statutory prohibition 
against discrimination). 
152. HUD v. Williams, No. 02-89-0459-1, 1991 WL 442796 (H.U.D.A.LJ. 
Mar. 22, 1991). 
153. Id. at *6,*18. 
154. See id. at *13-*18. 
155. Id. at *14. 
156. H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 30 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2173, 2191 (emphasis added); see Williams, 1991 WL 442796, at *14. 
157. Williams, 1991 WL 442796, at *14 (emphasis added) (quoting 24 
C.F.R. Ch. I, Subch. A, App. I at 577 (1990)). 
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well as applicants from certain inquiries." 158 Regardless of this 
"fog," the administrative law judge stated his conclusion broadly: 
Thus, since the House Report and preamble appear to sup-
port the interpretation that sitting tenants are included, 
and since there is no reason readily imaginable or argued 
to support the concept that Congress would intend protec-
tion from intrusive questioning for prospective tenants, but 
not sitting tenants, I find that section 804(£) of the Act [ 42 
U.S.C. § 3604] and 24 C.F.R. 100.202 provide that owners 
of housing do not have the right to ask sitting tenants, as 
well as prospective tenants, blanket questions about their 
disabilities. As argued by the Government, permitting 
landlords to ask their sitting tenants blanket questions 
about their disabilities that bear no relationship to the 
health of others would create an "open season" on the pri-
vacy rights, sensibilities and civil rights of persons with disa-
bilities, and would thereby violate the Act and 
regulations. 159 
An exception was noted: "However, although blanket ques-
tioning of sitting and prospective tenants as to their disabilities is 
not permissible, certain inquiries of individual tenants may be 
permissible,"160 if a nexus exists "'between the fact of the individ-
ual's tenancy and [an] asserted direct threat' to the health or 
safety of other individuals."161 Absent such a nexus, according to 
the administrative law judge, "such an inquiry is impermissible 
under the [FHA] ."162 
This issue has been addressed on one other occasion. With 
much more limited analysis, a federal district court in Nieder-
hauser v. Independence Square Haus. reached a similar conclusion 
regarding a federally-subsidized housing project that had 
inquired into tenants' ability to live independently: "Although a 
landlord may make necessary inquiries to determine an appli-
cant's qualifications for tenancy, the landlord may not inquire 
158. Williams, 1991 WL 442796, at *14; see, e.g., Implementation of the 
Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 53 Fed. Reg. 44992, 45001 (Nov. 7, 
1988) (discussing accompanying release of proposed no-inquiry rule, stating 
that "legislative history of the Fair Housing Amendments Act makes it clear that 
the Act was intended to prohibit landlords and owners [from] asking prospective 
tenants and buyers blanket questions about the individuals' disabilities") 
(emphasis added). 
159. Williams, 1991 WL 442796, at *14. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 100-711, at 29 (1988), reprinted in 1988 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2190. The administrative law judge mistakenly cites to page 
30 of the House Report rather than page 29.). 
162. Williams, 1991 WL 442796, at *14. 
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into the nature and extent of an applicant's or tenant's disabilities 
beyond that necessary to determine eligibility."163 The court did 
not specify whether it was relying on the no-inquiry regulation 
itself or on the broader statutory prohibitions. Unlike the 
administrative opinion in Williams, the federal court decision 
never addressed the fact that the no-inquiry regulation by its 
terms applied only to an "applicant."164 
Under this authority-the FHA, along with the decisions in 
Williams and Niederhauser-a long-term care facility should be 
allowed to inquire into a current resident's medical conditions to 
an appropriate extent. "Blanket" inquiries are not allowed-
inquiries must be relevant to the care provided or coordinated by 
the facility. 
Because a long-term care facility is obligated to provide per-
sonal and health care services, however, an "appropriate" inquiry 
may often be virtually equivalent to a blanket inquiry. 165 A nurs-
ing home has a legitimate need for extensive information, given 
residents' significant health care needs, and the facilities' legal 
obligation to provide comprehensive care. 166 Increasingly the 
same is true in assisted living facilities, as they admit and retain 
residents who need personal and health care on a daily basis. 167 
There is a world of difference between a landlord inquiring 
into a tenant's AIDS or ability to live independently, and a long-
term care facility seeking information for the purposes of care 
planning. In Williams and Niederhauser, the landlords at best were 
meddling in their tenants' affairs, and at worst were harassing 
them. By contrast, a long-term care facility has legal obligations 
to provide care, based on federal and state quality of care stan-
dards, and on contracts with residents. A facility's request for 
medical information likely might be driven not by animus or 
prejudice, but by a legitimate desire-indeed, an obligation-to 
provide appropriate care. 
163. Niederhauser, supra note 73, at ,r 16,305.5 (emphasis added). 
164. Id. But see Sturm, supra note 8, at 127 (concluding that "Niederhauser 
v. Independence Square Housing extended the regulation to cover existing 
tenants"). 
165. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(b) (2)-(3), 1396r(b) (2)-(3) (2000) 
(assessments and care plans in nursing homes); 42 C.F.R. § 483.20(b), (k) 
(2005) (same); and N.Y. Pus. HEALTH LAw § 4659(2) (West 2000 & Supp. 2007) 
(individualized service plan for each assisted living resident "developed with the 
resident, the resident's representative and resident's legal representative if any, 
the assisted living operator, and if necessary a home care services agency"). 
166. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(b), 1396r(b) (quality of care requirements in 
Nursing Home Reform Law). 
167. See supra Part I. 
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The administrative law judge in Williams acknowledged that 
a post-admission inquiry might be appropriate given the proper 
"nexus" between a tenant's handicap and the others' safety-in 
other words, if the tenant's handicap was a matter of the land-
lord's legitimate interest.168 In the long-term care context, the 
facility operator has a legitimate interest in a resident's care 
needs, with an obvious nexus between the resident's handicaps 
and the operator's obligations to provide necessary care services. 
Also, an operator's access to a resident's medical information is 
not likely to lead to the resident's eviction, because a facility gen-
erally cannot evict a resident except under certain situations 
specified in state or federal law. 169 
Admittedly, the case authority here is limited and ambigu-
ous. Although this Article's resolution of this issue is not self-
evident, the resolution is based on analysis that best reconciles 
the FHA's statutory language with the realities oflong-term care. 
The no-inquiry regulation does not apply to current facility 
residents, and the FHA's general provisions do not bar a facility 
from making good faith inquiries for purposes of assessment or 
care planning. 
VII. EACH F ACILITI' SHOULD ESTABLISH ADMISSION PRIORITI' 
FOR APPLICANTS WITH CARE NEEDS WITHIN 
F ACILITI'' s CAPABILITIES 
A. Priority Needed to Allow Facility to Obtain Corresponding Access 
to Applicants' Medical Records 
In order to obtain access to applicants' medical records, a 
long-term care facility would be well-advised to establish priority 
admission for applicants who need the level of care provided by 
the facility, and whose needs do not exceed the facility's maxi-
mum level of care. Such a priority could be used to justify access 
under the exception for "a priority available to persons ... with a 
particular type of handicap."170 
168. Williams, 1991 WL 442796, at *14. By allowing inquiries in certain 
circumstances into a tenant's dangerousness, the administrative law judge estab-
lishes that a no-inquiry rule for sitting tenants is not equivalent to the no-
inquiry regulation as applied to applicants.· As discussed previously, HUD 
explicitly declined in the regulation to allow pre-admission inquiries regarding 
an applicant's potential threat to others. See supra Part 111.B.1. · 
169. Nursing homes have relatively little discretion in evictions. See 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(c)(2)(A), 1396r(c)(2)(A) (2000) (limited reasons for evic-
tion in federal Nursing Home Reform Law); see42 C.F.R. § 483.12(a)(2) (2005) 
(same). Assisted living facilities have considerably more discretion, depending 
on state law. See generally Carlson, supra note 6, at 43-48. 
170. 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(c) (3) (2006). 
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Notably, such a priority generally could not be used to dis-
criminate against applicants with relatively greater care needs, 
unless those care needs exceeded the limits of the facility's 
license. 171 For example, a nursing home could not establish an 
admission priority that disfavored incontinent applicants, since 
incontinence is among the conditions for which a nursing facility 
must be prepared.172 If a policy purported to disfavor applicants 
whose care needs were within the facility's level of care but were 
relatively complicated or expensive, the policy would violate fed-
eral anti-discrimination law including the Americans with Disabil-
ities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 173 
If a facility had a formalized specialization, however, it could 
give priority to applicants in need of the specialized service. 
"Formalized" refers only to those specializations recognized by 
federal or state law. Without this limitation-for example, if a 
specialization could be based merely on a facility's claim-a facil-
ity might purport to have a multitude of specializations, and 
claim a right thereby to obtain a substantial portion of an appli-
cant's medical records. In point of fact, nursing homes fre-
quently claim to be specialists in a plethora of different care 
procedures. 174 
Thus, if a facility specializes in the care of residents with 
dementia, the facility should give priority to applicants with 
dementia. Using this priority, the facility will have the right to 
inquire if an applicant has been diagnosed with Alzheimer's dis-
ease or a comparable dementia. 175 
171. See supra Part II.B for discussion of state law provisions that prohibit 
residents with certain conditions from living in an assisted living setting. 
172. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(b)(4)(A)(i), 1396r(b)(4)(A)(i) (2000); see 
also 42 C.F.R. § 483.25(a) (1) (2005). 
173. See supra Part II.C. 
174. See, e.g., Fair View Nursing Home, http:/ /www.milebluff.com/fair_ 
view_nursing_home.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2007) (nursing home identifies 
physical therapy, occupational therapy, and speech therapy as "specialty ser-
vices"). These services actually are mandatory under the Nursing Home 
Reform Law. See, e.g., Golden State West Valley Convalescent Hospital, http:// 
www.goldenstatehealth.com/facilities/goldenstatewv.html (last visited Feb. 3 
2007) (nursing home "specializ[ing] in caring for residents recovering from 
illness or injury and for those needing continuous, long-term care"); Lorien 
Riverside Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, http:/ /www.lorienhealth.com/ 
riverside (last visited Feb. 3, 2007) (nursing home "specializing in skilled nurs-
ing and rehabilitation"); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(b) (4) (A) (i), 
1396r(b) (4) (A)(i); 42 C.F.R. § 483.45(a) (2005). Under Nursing Home 
Reform Law, required therapies include physical therapy, speech therapy, occu-
pational therapy, and mental health rehabilitative services. 
175. See supra Part V.B and notes 123, 130 for discussion of dementia 
specializations. 
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After an admission, a facility will not be subject to the no-
inquiry rule in its dealings with the now-resident. The facility will 
have wide-ranging access to medical information in order to 
assess the resident and then plan and provide care, provided that 
the information is not sought or used for harassment or another 
improper purpose. 176 
This progression-an initial light screen to determine 
appropriateness, followed after admission by a more extensive 
assessment-is comparable to the legally-approved process used 
in employment decisions. Under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (including their 
implementing regulations), an employer cannot inquire into an 
applicant's handicaps, but is allowed to ask whether the applicant 
is able to perform job-related functions. A hiring decision can be 
made conditional on successful completion of a medical exami-
nation, as long as the medical examination is required across the 
board.177 
B. Testing the Proposal: Admission Priorities and Access to Medical 
Records in Sample Situations 
Under these procedures, a long-term care facility generally 
will have a right only to a limited amount of medical information 
from an applicant. In most cases, an applicant should be able to 
demonstrate priority status with the release of only a handful of 
documents or, possibly, with no more than a certification by the 
applicant's physician. 
Compared to nursing homes, assisted living facilities in gen-
eral will be able to require more extensive disclosure, due to the 
176. See supra Part VI-VII; see also Ass1sTED LIVING QuALrIY INITIATIVE, 
supra note 31, at 68 (initial screening "to determine the setting's ability to meet 
the resident's anticipated health and service needs and preferences"; after 
admission, "a more complete assessment of the resident by an appropriately 
qualified person," including a "review of physical health, psychosocial status 
and cognitive status and determination of services necessary to meet those 
needs[, and] information from professionals with responsibility for the resi-
dent's physical or emotional health"). 
177. See42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (2000) (ADA); 14 C.F.R § 1251.203 (2006) 
(NASA regulations implementing Section 504); 24 C.F.R. § 8.13 (2006) (HUD 
regulations implementing Section 504); 29 C.F.R. 1630.14 (2006) (ADA regula-
tions); 45 C.F.R. § 84.14 (2005) (HHS regulations implementing Section 504); 
see also Implementation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 53 Fed. 
Reg. 44992, 45001 (Nov. 7, 1988) (FHA no-inquiry regulation drawn from Sec-
tion 504 regulations on pre-employment inquiries); Implementation of the Fair 
Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 54 Fed. Reg. 3232, 3246 (Jan. 23, 1989) (no-
inquiry regulation as an "adaptation of the 'pre-employment inquiries' provi-
sion in the section 504 regulations"). 
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greater risk that an assisted living facility will be incapable of 
meeting an applicant's needs. 178 Nursing homes almost always 
will be equipped to meet an applicant's long-term care needs, 
except in the relatively rare instances in which an applicant 
requires ventilator care or a similar non-mandatory service, or 
suffers from a mental illness that requires placement in a locked 
psychiatric facility. 179 
To explore these issues, this Article imagines two potential 
long-term care residents: Arthur Applicant and Sally Seeker. 
Each is 85 years-old and has lived alone at home until recently, 
receiving extensive in-home assistance. Mr. Applicant now needs 
long-term care primarily due to his weakness and his weight. He 
requires assistance to walk, or to transfer to or from a bed or 
chair. He weighs close to 250 pounds, and his in-home aides are 
having great difficulty in providing the necessary assistance. Mr. 
Applicant has insulin-dependent diabetes, requiring regular 
injections of insulin. He has shown some signs of forgetfulness, 
but overall his memory and reasoning are intact. 
Ms. Seeker's problems are more cognitive than physical. 
She has dementia, and its effects are becoming more and more 
pronounced as years go by. Her short-term memory is extremely 
limited, and last year she almost started a fire when she com-
pletely forgot that she had dinner heating up on the stove. 
In a drastic contrast from Ms. Seeker's previous demeanor, 
she is suspicious towards everyone but immediate family. In the 
last six months, she has driven away eight different personal care 
aides, either by firing them outright or by wearing them down 
with repetitive accusations of theft and disloyalty. Two months 
ago, after hurling a vase at a frightened aide, Ms. Seeker was held 
for observation in the local hospital's psychiatric ward. 
Mr. Applicant and Ms. Seeker each are applying for resi-
dence at two long-term care facilities: Nirvana Meadows Nursing 
Home and Amiable Estates Assisted Living Manor. Nirvana 
Meadows has no formalized specialization. It has established an 
admission priority for applicants who have handicaps but whose 
care needs do not exceed the level of care provided for under 
the nursing home's license. 
Amiable Estates has received certification from the state for 
a dementia specialization. Accordingly, its priorities include a 
preference for applicants with dementia, as well as a more gen-
eral preference for applicants with handicaps. Based on prohibi-
tions in state law, the facility refuses to admit any person who 
178. See supra Part II.A. 
179. Id. 
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needs around-the-clock nursing care or who requires assistance 
from two or more persons in order to transfer to or from a bed 
or chair. 
First, consider Mr. Applicant and his communication with 
Nirvana Meadows Nursing Home. He easily can establish a need 
for nursing home services, by submitting a limited number of 
medical records that demonstrate his need for assistance in trans-
ferring and injecting insulin. He may choose instead to submit a 
short physician statement, if his physician is willing to write one. 
A physician's statement should be sufficient to show that Mr. 
Applicant's care needs do not exceed a nursing home's maxi-
mum level of care. A record of a recent physical examination or 
assessment also should suffice. Nirvana Meadows should not be 
allowed to use the level-of-care ceiling to justify a broad request 
for medical records pertaining to Mr. Applicant. 
More information could be required from Mr. Applicant if 
he were to seek residence at Amiable Estates. Proof of needing 
the facility's care should be similar-submission of a physician 
statement or a limited number of medical records. The need for 
additional documentation would arise from Amiable Estate's 
right to inquire about dementia and a possible need for two-per-
son assistance. Given its dementia care specialization, the facility 
should be entitled to review records documenting Mr. Appli-
cant's memory problems. Also, because even limited review of 
Mr. Applicant's records would demonstrate a potential conflict 
with the two-person-assist prohibition, the facility should be 
within its rights to demand more than a physician's statement on 
the topic. On the other hand, a physician's statement should suf-
fice for establishing that Mr. Applicant does not require around-
the-clock nursing care, since the nursing home would have no 
indication that this prohibition would affect Mr. Applicant. 
Like Mr. Applicant, Ms. Seeker should be required to submit 
only limited information to support an application to Nirvana 
Meadows. A need for nursing home care could be demonstrated 
with a record of a recent physical examination or assessment, or 
with a short physician statement. Her physician could certify that 
her care needs do not exceed a nursing home's level-of-care 
ceiling. 
Ms. Seeker should not be required to submit information 
regarding her disputes with and suspicions about personal care 
aides. While this information will be relevant after admission to 
develop a care plan, it does not affect the appropriateness of Ms. 
Seeker's residence in Nirvana Meadows or any other nursing 
home. 
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As was true in Mr. Applicant's case, Ms. Seeker can be 
required to disclose additional information to Amiable Estates. 
Because the facility has a recognized specialization in dementia 
care, it likely is within its rights to request records documenting 
Ms. Seeker's cognitive problems. Ms. Seeker would not be 
required to disclose the vase-throwing incident or her suspicions 
towards personal care aides. The facility should be entitled to 
only the disclosure necessary to establish that Ms. Seeker has 
dementia. 
Other relevant issues-needing assisted living facility care, 
and not exceeding the level-of-care ceiling-should be addressed 
with a limited release of records or a physician's statement. 
Nothing about Ms. Seeker's profile indicates that her care needs 
exceed what can be provided in an assisted living facility. Specifi-
cally, she does not require around-the-clock nursing care or two-
person assistance in transferring. 
VIII. RESPONDING TO POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS 
This Article's analysis is well-grounded in the FHA and other 
relevant legal authority. Admittedly, however, its conclusions are 
largely theoretical, owing to the absence of evidence that the 
FHA ever has been applied in a long-term care admission. As a 
matter of course, long-term care facilities assume broad access to 
an applicant's medical records and, indeed, access generally is 
provided without question. 
Long-term care facilities likely will resist this Article's reason-
ing, based on a general belief that the FHA's no-inquiry doctrine 
is incompatible with long-term care realities. 180 One possible 
argument may be directed at the cases holding that long-term 
care facilities are subject to the FHA. A facility might point out 
that the vast majority of these cases pertain to zoning and none 
of them involve a facility's admission decisions. 181 
Another argument might point out that health care provid-
ers routinely have wide access to patients' medical information. 
Why, this argument asks, should a health care provider have its 
hands tied behind its back just because it couples health care 
with housing? 
The response to these arguments is based both on law and 
policy. The legal response is simple: if a long-term care facility is 
considered a "dwelling" under the FHA, it is governed by the 
180. See, e.g., Sturm, supra note 8, at 127 (suggesting that application of 
the no-inquiry regulation might be unworkable in the context of continuing 
care retirement communities). 
181. See supra Part IV.B. 
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FHA in all aspects of its operation. The FHA's definition of 
"dwelling" is not conditional in any way.182 
This legal argument is buttressed by fairness considerations. 
If a facility can invoke the FHA in order to protect its own inter-
ests in a zoning dispute, it should not be allowed to disavow the 
FHA when an applicant seeks to invoke it in an admission dis-
pute. The FHA was enacted primarily to protect persons with 
handicaps, not the facilities that house them. 
As to the supposed prejudice to long-term care facilities, as 
compared to other health care providers, consider that other 
health care providers generally do not pick and choose their 
patients in the way that long-term care facilities accept or reject 
applicants. Many health care providers do not see medical 
records until after a person has become a patient. Furthermore, 
in one situation in which screening had become a problem, Con-
gress enacted federal law specifically to prevent hospitals from 
"dumping" patients who were perceived as undesirable. 183 
Furthermore and finally, long-term care facilities legiti-
mately face greater obligations because they provide housing 
along with health care. A nursing home or assisted living facility 
is home to its residents, and an applicant's choice of home 
should not be denied due to irrelevant medical conditions. 
CONCLUSION 
The FHA's no-inquiry regulation should be enforced against 
long-term care facilities. Active enforcement would present facil-
ities with a choice-do nothing and be barred from obtaining 
any medical information from applicants, or establish appropri-
ate admission priorities and be given reasonable access to appli-
cants' relevant medical information. 
Most facilities undoubtedly would choose to establish appro-
priate priorities. In turn, consumers would benefit both from 
the priorities and from the limits placed on the facilities' infor-
mation-gathering. 
This analysis should not be seen as merely reconciling extant 
long-term care procedures with the Fair Housing Act. The no-
inquiry regulation does not condone business as usual in long-
term care. Currently, many long-term care facilities at admission 
require extensive medical information-far more than is needed 
to determine if an applicant is appropriate for a facility. Enforce-
182. See Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2000). 
183. See Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395dd (2000). 
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ment of the no-inquiry regulation would properly limit a facility's 
ability to discriminate on the basis of medical condition. 
Applicants for long-term care are acutely vulnerable to dis-
crimination, and would benefit greatly from active enforcement 
of the no-inquiry regulation. Applicants' attorneys and HUD 
each should take steps to investigate and then initiate enforce-
ment actions against offending long-term care providers. The 
status quo-in which long-term care facilities have de facto 
immunity from the no-inquiry regulation-is without legal or 
moral justification. 
